REMARKS/ARGUMENTS

Claims 1-12 and 14-20 remain in this application for further review. As noted in the Office Action, the applicants' attorney has canceled Claim 13. Also, claims 8 and 15 are currently amended to correct minor typographical errors. No other claims are currently amended and no new matter has been added.

I. Rejection of Claims 1-12 and 14-20 for Nonstatutory Double Patenting

In paragraph 3 of the Office Action, claims 1-12 and 14-20 were rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting. Claims 1-12 and 14-20 were rejected over claims 1-21 of U.S. Patent No. 6,748,461. Applicants disagree with the rejection and the comments associated therewith. Applicants do not concede any of the assertions, in paragraph 3, pertaining to obviousness. Notwithstanding applicants' disagreement, attached hereto in the appendix is a timely filed terminal disclaimer that complies with the Code of Federal Regulations. Accordingly, the double patenting rejection of claims 1-12 and 14-20 are obviated.

II. Rejection of Claims 1-4, 6-12 and 14-19 under 35 U.S.C. 102(e)

Claims 1-4, 16-12 and 14-19 were rejected under 35 U.S.C 102(e) as being anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 6,446,253B1 issued to Mellmer ("Mellmer"). Applicants respectfully disagree with this rejection. Mellmer is not even remotely related to the invention recited in the claims of the present invention.

Claims 1, 9 and 14 are independent claims and claims 2-8, 10-12, and 15-20 depend therefrom, respectively. Claim 1 recites "a namespace including a plurality of objects, at least one of the objects being associated with a general-purpose event component, the at least one object identifying the general-purpose event component and including a sub-object that defines a set of resources used by the at least one object, wherein the at least one object is distinguishable

from other objects in the namespace that specify other general-purpose event components." (Emphasis added).

Contrary to the contentions set forth in the Office Action, Mellmer does not teach or otherwise suggest the limitations of claim 1. Mellmer teaches a program framework for use in a networked system in which data sources are stored. (Col. 1, lines 65-67). The storage system can include data stored anywhere in the networked system, yet references to the data appear to the user as references to a local storage system. (Col. 2, lines 1-4). Associated with each data source is one or more view, where a view is a user defined logical interface for accessing the data source. (Col. 2, lines 4-7). The view is mapped to a implementation which identifies either or both of a communication protocol for accessing the data source. (Col. 2, lines 7-9). As such, the logical interface to the data source is separated from the methods for implementing accessing or operating the resource. (Col. 2, lines 9-13). Stated another way, the program framework has a data organization that separates logical interfaces from physical implementations. (Col. 13, lines 38-43).

Contrary to the Office Action's proposition, Mellmer does not teach that at least one of the objects is associated with a general-purpose-event component. Starting in column 9, line 55, Mellmer teaches various attributes of the user interface. Referring to Figure 9 of Mellmer, Mellmer teaches that the generic user interface includes six different architecture components (graphical components of the GUI). (Col. 9, lines 55-63) The six architecture components include a name recognition component, a tool belt component, a navigation component, a content component, a context component and a notification component. (Col. 9, lines 63-67). All of the components are objects, each which has an associated view that is either dynamically provided or designed by the user (referring to the images depicted on the GUI). (Col. 9, line 67-col. 10, line 2).

Moreover, Mellmer does not teach that the object includes a sub-object that defines a set of resources used by the at least one object. Mellmer merely states that "[t]he content field 23c identifies the object, and therefore may identify any type of resource." (Col. 5, lines 44-45). The Office Action takes this statement out of context. Mellmer is not teaching that the object includes a sub-object that defines a set of resources used by the object. When considering

Mellmer and the present invention it is required to look at both as a whole. The mere fact that a reference uses similar terminology as an application does not mean that a reference teaches the same invention as the application.

With regard to claim 2 of the present invention, claim 2 recites that "the resources used by the at least one object comprise I/O space resources." This limitation is not taught or otherwise suggested by the cited art. In fact the Office Action fails to cite any section of Mellmer that teaches such a limitation. This is not surprising since Mellmer is not related to a power management and configuration system.

Claim 3 recites that "the resources used by the at least one object comprise memory space resources." Column 6, lines 1-5 do not teach this limitation as the Office Action suggests. Mellmer teaches that "[i]n one embodiment of the invention, while a name may be loaded into working memory as soon as it is accessed, the object associated with the name may not be created or copied in working memory until the name is implemented." Again, the Office Action takes this language out of context.

Claim 4 recites that "the at least one object further comprises at least one control method to handle a notice generated by a hardware device." (Emphasis added) As cited in the Office Action, Mellmer teaches that "[a] smart folder is a namespace query over some protocol (for example, an internet search engine) that is executed at standard intervals and notifies a user when new data appears, similar to a mail program's notification of new mail." (Col. 7, lines 44-48). Here, the notice is not generated by a hardware device.

Claim 6 of the present invention recites that "the at least one object is dynamically loadable into a namespace in response to a hardware component associated with the at least one object being added to a computing system associated with the computer-readable medium." The portion of Mellmer cited in the office action does not teach this limitation. Contrary to the Office Action, Mellmer does not mention hardware components of an object.

With regard to claim 7 of the present invention, claim 7 recites that "the at least one object is unloadable from the namespace." According to the Office Action, Mellmer teaches that "[i]n one embodiment, when a particular namespace is accessed/created, only the names are

retrieved/generated: no code or objects for any of the objects that the names refer to are loaded." Here, Mellmer states that the object is not loaded; Mellmer does not state that the object is unloaded. (Emphasis added).

Regarding claim 8, the Office Action did not specifically address claim 8. Claim 8 recites that "the namespace further comprises a second object associated with a second general-purpose event component, the second object not having a defined set of resources used by the second object, the absence of the defined set of resources being indicative that the second object comprises a root general-purpose event component." Applicants cannot find any teaching or suggestion of these limitations in Mellmer.

The Office Action recites that claim 9 contains similar limitations as set forth in claim 1. However, such a contention is untrue. Claim 9 is an independent claim that recites the instruction of "receiving an instruction to load a general-purpose event block device into a configuration namespace, the general-purpose event block device including an object that defines a set of resources used by the general-purpose event block device." Claim 9 also recites "loading the general-purpose event block device into the namespace at a location.", "receiving another instruction to load another general-purpose event block device into the configuration namespace" and "loading the other general-purpose event block device into the namespace at another location." Mellmer teaches none of these limitations in any manner. The Office Action's reliance on the rejection of claim 1 is misplaced insofar as the two claims contain very different language.

With regard to claims 10-12, applicants respectfully disagree with the Office Action. Applicants rely on the same rationale set forth above in support for claims 7, 2 and 3 above. Regarding independent claim 14, applicants rely on the argument set forth above in support for claim 1. Claim 15 recites that "the second data object further comprises a set of resources used by the second data object." Applicants assert that the arguments set forth above in support for claim 1 sufficiently obviate the Office Action's contentions with respect to claim 15.

Claim 16 recites that "the second general-purpose event component comprises a root general purpose event component, and wherein the first general-purpose event component

comprises a secondary general-purpose event component." Column 7, lines 1-17 of Mellmer teach a parent/child relationship of a file system. Mellmer does not teach a root general purpose event component in any manner.

Claim 17 recites that "the first data object and the second data object are stored within a namespace associated with a configuration management system." Claim 18 recites that "the first data object and the second data object are stored within an Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) associated with a configuration management system." Claim 19 recites that "the first data object and the second data object are read from the BIOS and stored within a namespace associated with a configuration management system." Claim 20 recites that "the first general-purpose event component and the second general-purpose event component each comprise a hardware device electrically coupled to one or more other hardware devices such that a signal generated by the one or more other hardware devices is presented by the respective general-purpose event component to the configuration management system in the form of an interrupt." These limitations are not taught or otherwise suggested by the cited art. In the same manner stated above, none of the citations in the Office Action implicate any of these claims.

As stated hereinabove, claims 1-4, 6-12 and 14-19 are clearly allowable under 35 U.S.C. 102(e). The Office Action fails to consider both the cited art and the present invention as a whole and therefore, the present invention and the cited art have been misconstrued.

II. Rejection of claims 5 and 20 under 35 U.S.C 103

Claims 5 and 20 were rejected under 35 U.S.C 103 as being unpatentable over Mellmer in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,711,632 issued to Chow et. al ("Chow"). Applicants respectfully disagree with the rejection. There is no suggestion in any of the references that they may be modified in the manner suggested. Also, even if for argument purposes such a modification could be made, the cited references still fail to teach all the limitations of the claims. Furthermore, the 35 U.S.C. 103 rejection depends from the above stated 35 U.S.C. 102(e) rejection. The claims are clearly allowable under 35 U.S.C. 102(e) and therefore, the 35 U.S.C. 103 rejection should be withdrawn.

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In view of the above amendments and remarks, Applicants respectfully request a Notice of Allowance. If the Examiner believes a telephone conference would advance the prosecution of this application, the Examiner is invited to telephone the undersigned at the below-listed telephone number.

Respectfully submitted,

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